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ABSTRACT 
 
Real Wage Cyclicality in Germany and the UK: 
New Results Using Panel Data*
 
This paper compares the cyclical behaviour of male real wages in Germany and the UK using 
the German Socio-Economic Panel 1984-2002 and the British Household Panel Survey 
1991-2004. We distinguish between job stayers (remaining in the same job), and within- and 
between-company job movers. Stayers are the large majority in both countries. Using 
changes in the unemployment rate as the cyclical measure, we find real wages of stayers in 
the private sector in West Germany – but not East Germany – to be procyclical, and quite 
sensitive to unemployment, comparable to the US and the UK. We find cyclicality in the 
public sector in neither country. Thus real wage flexibility is similar in the two countries, apart 
from East Germany, despite apparent differences in wage-setting institutions. 
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REAL WAGE CYCLICALITY IN GERMANY AND THE UK: NEW RESULTS 
USING PANEL DATA
 
I. Introduction 
This paper analyses real wage adjustment over the business cycle using panel micro data 
for Germany 1984-2002 and the British Household Panel Survey 1991-2004. We follow 
here our companion paper which analyses real wage adjustment in Italy (Peng and 
Siebert, 2006). Germany, like Italy, has a regulated economy which forms an instructive 
contrast with the more flexible economies of the US and the UK, which have been shown 
to have significant real wage flexibility, using micro panel data (see Devereux 2001 for 
the US; and Devereux and Hart 2006 for the UK). Our aim is to provide a factual basis 
for inquiry, using microeconomic panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(GSOEP). We will apply the same variable definitions and analytical methods to the 
UK’s British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), thus allowing a close comparison 
between Germany and the UK. Our study will have the further interest, for the UK 
economy, of providing results from the BHPS which can be compared to Devereux and 
Hart’s (2006) analysis using the New Earnings Survey. 
 
In practice, it is difficult unambiguously to classify a country’s wage-setting 
institutions. Most discussions accept that collective agreements in the UK and the US are 
only important in certain sectors, and are neither centralised and/or coordinated. But 
Germany is more difficult. Franz and Pfeiffer (2006, Table 3) find that 57% of (private 
sector) employers they questioned believed labour union contracts were very important in 
preventing wage cuts for unskilled workers. However, this figure leaves a substantial 
minority, and the more skilled workers, for whom union contracts are not important. At 
the same time, Germany’s system of pattern bargaining can be taken as highly 
coordinated (see e.g., Kenworthy, 2001, Figure 1), and also “governable” in Traxler’s 
(2003) terms due to the legal enforceability of collective agreements. Ochel (2005, 105) 
argues that pattern bargaining, with wage agreements following the metalworking 
industry located in prosperous regions, may result in wages which are “excessive” for the 
economically weaker regions. On the other hand, he notes the possibility that Germany’s 
coordinated wage setting results in wages being more responsive to macroeconomic 
shocks, since coordination assists in aligning the bargaining parties’ expectations. In 
other words, the parties’ gains to changing wages are higher if all change, so that there is 
a “strategic complementarity” (Ball and Romer, 1991) in wage adjustments. In this paper 
we directly test whether such coordination makes real wages responsive to 
macroeconomic shocks, making a crucial distinction between West and East Germany. 
 
Our methodology which relies on panel data for individuals allows fine 
distinctions to be made between country regions, between public and private sector, and 
by firm size. It is worth testing all of these distinctions, which have implications for the 
way institutions affect wage flexibility. Thus, lower real wage procylicality among large 
firms - which are more affected by collective bargaining – would suggest this factor 
causes stickiness. Similarly, lower procyclicality in the public than the private sector 
would point to the extra authority of the state in setting public sector wages (Traxler, 
1999), as well as softer public sector budget constraints. The alternative approach is to 
use aggregate country data, which is the method followed by current studies from the 
international wage flexibility project (Dickens et al, 2006; also Holden and Wulfsberg, 
2007). This approach suggests widespread real wage rigidity since wage changes clump 
near expected inflation rates. Downward nominal wage rigidity also appears common. 
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However, the aggregate method cannot test for differences within countries, which is our 
contribution. 
  
A further advantage of our methodology is that we can follow Devereux and 
Hart’s (2006) distinction between job stayers (remaining in the same job over the year), 
internal movers (i.e., within-company movers), and external movers (between-company). 
While job stayers are the most important numerically, bumping workers within the 
company up and down a job ladder (Reder’s (1955) theory of internal job ladders) can 
provide a valuable further form of flexibility even if wages for stayers are rigid. 
Furthermore, as regards external movers, if this group experiences large real wage 
changes with the cycle, the implication is that incumbents are receiving rents. Again, 
such a finding might provide an insight into the working of labour market institutions in 
the particular case.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. In section II, we present our 
estimation methods, and in Section III, we describe the data. Section IV examines the 
basic predictions of theoretical models by region and compares our results with other 
findings. In Section IV, we also test the robustness of our results by company size and 
public-private sector. The final section concludes. 
 
II Estimation methods 
Our empirical work uses the-standard two-step estimation procedure (beginning with 
Solon, 1994). The two-step procedure is designed to get round the Moulton (1986) 
problem that, though we have thousands of individuals, each year provides only one 
business cycle (unemployment) observation. Moulton (1986) shows that individuals in 
the same year will share some common component of variance that is not entirely 
attributable either to their measured characteristics (e.g., gender and age) or to the 
aggregate unemployment rate in that year. In this case, the error component in simple 
OLS regression will be positively correlated across people in the same year, so we will 
underestimate the standard error on the unemployment variable.  
 
 To circumvent this problem, in step 1 we estimate a wage change equation using 
individual data. This equation is given by: 
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where wit is the real hourly wage rate, Ageit  is a cubic in age, Yt denotes a year dummy, 
and itε is a random error term. MWit denotes a dummy variable for internal movers, and 
MBit is a dummy variable for external movers. This step gives us a time series of wage 
changes for the stayers, st; for the within-company movers, wt; and for the between-
company movers, bt. 
 
In step 2, we then derive estimates of the wage cyclicality of stayers, for example, 
by regressing st  on the unemployment change variable (we lag this one year, using Δut-1), 
and a linear time trend. In this step, we only have time series variation, reducing the 
number of observations – in our case 19 years for West Germany (1984-2002), 11 years 
for the East Germany (1992-2002) and 13 years for the UK (1991/2-2003/4). Again, this 
problem is standard (for example, Shin, 1994, has 12 time series observations), and the 
solution adopted, which we follow, is to use weighted least squares where the weights are 
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the numbers of individuals observed in a given year. Our data cover more than one full 
business cycle in Germany and the UK. This equation is given by: 
 
                       0 1 1 2tˆ ts u Yeart tδ δ δ−= + Δ + +ν
                                                
                                                             (2) 
Equation (2) links to the decomposition of wage cyclicality given in the Appendix. 
Alternatively, using  in equation (2), the coefficient on Δutwˆ t-1 gives the incremental 
wage response of within-company movers relative to stayers. Similarly, by using  as 
the dependent variable we can derive the incremental wage response of between-
company movers relative to stayers.  
tbˆ
 
Specification of the variables in equations (1) and (2) requires care in several 
respects, which we will cover in turn. First, there is the definition of the wage variable. 
Here we take quite a broad definition1, including overtime, bonuses, and profit-sharing 
(and also pay from second jobs in the case of the GSOEP) because this definition allows 
the best comparison between the GSOEP and the BHPS. This wage measure is close to 
the measures used in Solon et al (1994) and Devereux (2001) for the United States, and 
Peng and Siebert (2006) for Italy. Use of the broad definition will reduce the measured 
extent of rigidity: basic wages could be rigid while there could be flexibility in other 
components, especially bonuses and overtime. Thus, our results may show higher 
flexibility than results using the basic wage such as Devereux and Hart (2006) for the UK 
(see below). Still, flexibility imparted by variation in overtime and bonuses is genuine 
flexibility and should be considered. 
 
A further issue is the definition of the wage deflator. Both the GSOEP and the 
BHPS provide data on consumer prices. We find it appropriate to deflate wages in 
Germany (West or East) by price indices for the appropriate region. In the case of the UK, 
we use a single price index. 
 
Next, there is the definition of the hours variable. Since we work with annual 
earnings for Germany, we require a measure of annual hours. Annual hours worked is 
calculated by adding together the estimated annual hours of full-time, part-time, and 
short-time work.2 For the UK, the hourly wage is computed as the latest gross pay 
divided by the number of hours in the pay period. The working hours of the last pay 
period is the product of the number of weeks in the last pay period times weekly working 
hours including normal and overtime.  
 
Errors in reporting of hours can give rise to spurious cyclicality of wages. In 
particular, workers may report contract hours rather than actual hours worked, causing 
reported hours to remain overly steady from year to year. Such understatement of the 
cyclicality of hours will give an overstatement of the cyclicality of hourly wages. We 
have checked our hours variable carefully. We find, even with 10 percent tolerance of the 
change in hours, on average, only 65% of job stayers had the same reported weekly hours 
in two adjacent years in the Germany. Tests on the BHPS also show many changes year-
on-year in working hours. Only about 77% of job stayers have the same reported normal 
weekly hours in adjacent year. Thus, there seems to be significant variation in reported 
 
1 We exclude the self-employed, because of difficulties with the reliability of their self-reported pay figures. 
2 Annual hours of work in each of these three states is calculated by multiplying the average number of 
hours worked per week by the number of months worked in each of these three states for the previous year 
and by 4.33 (the average number of weeks per month). 
 4
hours from year to year in both Germany and the UK, especially given that true hours are 
likely to remain constant for most stayers. Furthermore, hours show some significant 
procyclicality in a regression with the unemployment rate, which is reasonable. Thus, we 
take it that the bias from misreporting of hours is not large for our data.  
 
Next, there is the issue of whether to use a regionally differentiated 
unemployment variable, or a country-wide variable. If labour mobility between regions is 
low, then regional differentiation is indicated. We experimented with both types, 
including a South versus North-Central split for the UK, as well as the obvious East-West 
split for Germany. We found that regional differentiation for Germany gave the most 
sensible results, together with a single unemployment variable for the UK, and 
accordingly report this specification. 
 
There is also the question of forming the stayer and the within- and between-
company mover groups. For both datasets, we use tenure with the company: if the tenure 
is one year or less, the respondent is a between-company mover, otherwise, a job stayer 
or within-company mover. (We remove new entrants to the labour market from the 
category of external movers.). We identify a job stayer as an employee who answers yes 
to the direct question “Are you working in your original job?” in the case of the GSOEP, 
and a similar question for the BHPS3. If there is a missing value for this question, we 
identify a stayer as an individual who has no change in residential area, working sector 
and industry. A within-company mover is then a worker whose tenure is more than one 
year but is not a job stayer.4
 
Finally, there is the question of what to do about structural breaks over time. For 
East Germany, we drop the 1991 observation, so as to avoid the special wage turbulence 
associated with re-unification. For West Germany, there is the possibility that over the 
long time period we consider, the underlying bargaining structure changes, particularly 
since the late 1990s (see Doellgast and Greer, 2007). In fact, our sample period for 
Germany ends in 2002, and hence will not be much affected by such recent changes. 
 
III. Data Description 
The GSOEP is a wide-ranging representative longitudinal study of private households in 
Germany. The same private households, persons and families have been surveyed yearly 
since 1984 (the GSOEP West). In June 1990, the survey was extended to the territory of 
the former German Democratic Republic (the GSOEP East). In 1984, 5,624 households 
containing a total of 15,729 individual respondents participated in the GSOEP West. 
After the joining of the GSOEP East in 1990, an immigrant sample was added as well to 
account for the changes that took place in Germany society in 1994/95. Further new 
samples were added in 1998, 2000 and 2002. Thus, with a high degree of stability over 
                                                 
3 The BHPS asks a direct question: “What was the date you started working in your present position, by 
that I mean the beginning of your current spell of the job you are doing now for your present employer?” 
which provides clear information about the starting year of the job spell.  
4 The GSOEP provides good data on 17 residential areas, public/private sector and one digit (9) and two 
digit (33) industries of current jobs. We choose one digit industries to define the job stayer here, because 
using two digit industries affects little. When we limit the sample only to those defined as job stayers from 
the direct question, our basic conclusions do not change. For the BHPS, we use 19 residential areas, 
public/private sector and four digit (9999) industries of current job to define job stayers. However, the 
BHPS updated the industry categorisation from the SIC80 to the SIC92 in the 2002/2003 survey. Thus, 
only in that year, we use one digit (5) industries. Our results for the UK are not sensitive to the choice of 
industry variables rather than the direct question. 
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time, there were 12,055 households containing a total 29,982 individual respondents 
participating in 2002. 
 
For this research, we formed an unbalanced panel of 20,574 male workers with 
clear employment information, in which 16,474 workers are from West Germany for the 
period 1984-2002 and 4,100 from East Germany for the period 1992-2002 (see Table 1).5 
In concentrating on males, we are following the literature (e.g., Devereux, 2001; Shin and 
Solon, 2006). In any case, the female participation rate in Germany is only about 65 
percent, compared with about 80 percent for the males, so that our female sample would 
be much less than males, giving difficulties when we analyse sub-groups. 
 
For the United Kingdom, we use the first thirteen waves of the BHPS, which was 
designed as an annual survey of each adult (16+) member of a nationally representative 
sample of more than 5,000 households in the UK, making a total of approximately 
10,000 individual interviews yearly. The same individuals are re-interviewed in 
successive waves. A development in 1999/2000 was the recruitment of two additional 
samples from Scotland and Wales to increase the relatively small sample sizes for these 
regions. In 2001/2002, an additional sample from Northern Ireland was added. Thus, the 
sample should remain broadly representative of the whole population of the UK as it 
changed through the 1990s and beyond. From this dataset, we formed an unbalanced 
panel of 13,758 male workers with clear employment information. 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for (the former) West and East Germany and 
the UK, for the key variables. The three columns seem quite similar in the first and 
second panels, apart from the fact that the workplaces are much smaller in the UK (68% 
small/medium companies) and East Germany (66.3%) than West Germany (only 47%).6 
There is a somewhat higher proportion working in private sector in the West Germany, 
but few temps and part timers in either country, as is to be expected in an all-male sample. 
It seems that the proportion of job stayers is a little higher in the West Germany, while 
the external movers’ proportion is a little higher in the East. The internal movers’ 
proportion is distinctly lower in the UK than Germany, either west or east. Perhaps the 
bigger firm size of German companies provides more space and resources for internal 
promotion/demotion than in the UK.  
 
(Table 1 around here) 
 
As regards wage levels, we see that wages in the West are much higher than in the 
East. There is an overall wage gap of approximately 40 percent between the East and 
West. Also, for both German regions (and for the UK), public sector wages are 
equivalent to wages of large companies in the private sector, which are about 20 percent 
higher than small/medium companies in the private sector.  
 
In Germany, centralised collective agreements have been used to push East 
German wages up from 7% of West German levels at the time of unification in 1989, to 
                                                 
5 Though the GSOEP East actually started in 1990, there is no employment information for workers in 
1990 and 1991. Thus, our data for the East Germany is actually for the period of 1992-2002. 
6 The GSOEP and the BHPS can only provide categorized information by employer size. We define a small 
company as a workplace with less than 20 (25) employees, a medium company as one with from 20 (25) to 
200 employees, and a big company as one with 200 to 2000 (1000) employees. A large company has 2000 
(1000) or more employees in Germany (the UK).   
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about 72 % in 2002 (Ochel 2005). As Ochel (2005, 167) argues, the initial collective 
wage negotiations in Germany were “proxy negotiations” that were carried out by West 
Germany employers’ associations and trade unions with the aim of equalisation of wages 
across Germany. High welfare payments subsequently have permitted the high wages to 
continue. This uplifting of wages in the East seems to have had the same speed in the 
public and large-firm private sectors, but been somewhat slower in the small firm 
category (a 40% gap can be detected here between East and West).  
 
Evidence on the uplifting of East German wages is also shown in the wage change 
data at the bottom of the table, where we see that job stayers and internal movers in the 
East Germany have faster wage growth than those in the West. However, external movers 
do not. In fact, external movers in both East and West Germany suffer negative wage 
changes on average – in contrast to the UK – pointing to involuntary moves, and rents for 
incumbents7.  
 
IV. Empirical results 
The GSOEP results for the unemployment change coefficients from equation (2) are 
reported in Table 2, for the East and West separately. We differentiate between the public 
sector and the private sector. Also, within the private sector we consider different size 
company categories to test whether the opt-out from collective agreements (Ochel, 2005, 
95) permitted to small firms makes their wage movements any more procyclical. 
Furthermore, small companies (under 5 or 10 employees in the legislation) are less likely 
to be covered by employment protection laws (Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst 2006, p19), 
meaning less shielding of job stayers and accordingly more wage flexibility 
 
 (Table 2 near here) 
 
The table shows markedly different labour markets in the West and East. Real 
wages of job stayers in the private sector in the West, regardless of the firm size, exhibit 
significant and highly procyclical movements. However, private sector wages in the East 
are rigid except for large firms with more than 2000 employees. It appears as though the 
pattern bargaining in the West delivers wage flexibility in that area’s private sector, but 
not in the East. Interestingly, there is no evidence of greater flexibility among small firms 
in the West, which suggests that there is not so much benefit to being “untrammelled” by 
collective agreements. Put in another way, for the big firms which lead the collective 
bargaining, the benefits of coordination are real. However, these benefits do not extend to 
the East, where wages set are above equilibrium except for the very large firms (2000+). 
Public sector wage behaviour is more similar in the two regions, being completely 
inflexible. 
 
The results for the BHPS are presented in Table 3. The top panel gives results for 
the country as a whole, while the bottom reports on the South-North split. Taking the 
whole country first, we see that the pattern of real wage cyclicality is similar to that in the 
West Germany, with the private sector flexible, and the public sector not. (Here we differ 
from Devereux and Hart (2006) who find significant, though lower, flexibility for the UK 
public sector based on New Earnings Survey data.) It is also worth noting how in the 
public sector the incremental wage effect for external movers is high and significant (-
                                                 
7 Our wage change statistics for the UK are similar to those in Devereux and Hart (2006), in particular the 
large positive wage changes for between-company movers. 
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3.94). This result implies that moving into and out of public sector over the cycle has 
strong wage consequences, as would be expected if rents were available to incumbent 
workers in the sector. 
 
(Table 3 around here) 
 
 In the bottom panel we give some results from experiments with dividing the UK 
into two regions: the South, and the North, using corresponding regional unemployment 
rates. Here we pool the public and private sectors for simplicity. As can be seen, there is 
not much difference in the estimates for the two regions, in both of which stayers’ real 
wages are significantly procyclical. The chi-square test for equality of coefficients is 
easily passed. Thus, there in no extra wage inflexibility in the UK’s North, such as might 
occur if wage-setting mechanisms imposed wage movements derived from the 
prosperous South. The picture of regional labour segmentation in Germany, and Italy (see 
Feng and Siebert, 2006) is quite different.  
 
Comparing Tables 2 and 3 we see that wage flexibility in the private sector of the 
UK appears to be similar to that in West Germany. Further, it must be remembered that 
we are using a similar wage definition for both datasets, and are comparing like with like. 
The finding UK (private sector) wage flexibility is just as great as – if not greater than – 
West German, is a point against the view that coordination of bargaining is necessary for 
firms in an industry to be willing to alter their wages. In fact, there has not been much 
coordination of private sector bargaining in the UK for some time. For example, the 
famous engineering agreement came to an end in 1989, when the Engineering Employers 
withdrew from national bargaining.  
 
Making comparisons with other research using panel data, our findings in Tables 
2 and 3 indicate that real wage cyclicality - for West Germany at least - is comparable 
with that in the US and UK. Thus, for male stayers in the US, Solon et al (1994) find an 
elasticity of -1.2 for male stayers, and Shin and Solon (2006) find a similar -1.5. Also for 
the US, Devereux (2001) finds -1.09 for male job stayers (using a narrow wage 
definition). For the UK, Devereux and Hart (2006) find -1.93 for male private sector 
stayers, which is a little lower than our findings for the BHPS, perhaps due to their using 
a more narrowly defined wage variable. For Italy, Peng and Siebert (2006) find 
considerable wage cyclicality for private sector male stayers in the Northern Italy (-3.6) 
but inflexibility in the Centre-South region. Thus, the problem of inflexible real wages 
affects specifically lagging regions such as East Germany and Southern Italy, and of 
course the public sector everywhere. 
. 
VI. Conclusions 
This paper compares the cyclical behaviour of male real wages in Germany and the UK 
using the GSOEP 1984-2002 and the BHPS 1991-2004. Following the methodology in 
particular of Devereux and Hart (2006) we distinguish between job stayers (remaining in 
the same job), and within- and between-company job movers. Stayers are the large 
majority in both countries. Using changes in the unemployment rate as the cyclical 
measure, we find real wages of stayers in the private sector in West Germany – but not 
East Germany – to be procyclical, and quite sensitive to unemployment, comparable to 
the US and the UK. We find cyclicality in the public sector in neither country. 
Furthermore, for the UK we find that real wages in the North are just as procyclical as in 
the-South. There is nothing like the marked and continuing regional labour market 
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segmentation that is to be found between West and East Germany, or North and South 
Italy. 
 
The results suggest that real wages are not sticky in the private sectors both of 
the UK and West Germany. It is in the public sector of both countries, and in East 
Germany, that stickiness occurs. However, we might argue that both these cases of sticky 
wages are special. For the public sector case, there might be little reason to expect labour 
demand movements to be in step with the aggregate unemployment rate, and for East 
German case there is the unique shock of unification. We are then left with a comparison 
of the private sectors of the UK and West Germany, both of which appear to be similarly 
flexible, whatever the underlying differences in wage-setting institutions – be it the 
pattern bargaining coordination of West Germany, or the company bargaining and 
individualism of the UK. The policy conclusion seems to be that when regions within a 
country are reasonably prosperous, the two types of wage-setting institution give the 
same result. However, when a region is lagging, as in the case of East Germany or Italy’s 
South, pattern bargaining delays recovery.
 9
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Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations, Males in the GSOEP and the BHPS 
 
(Standard deviations in parentheses) 
 
Variable 
 
West 
Germany 
(1984-
2002) 
East 
Germany 
(1992-
2002) 
UK 
(1991-
2004) 
Private sector 0.805 0.772 0.783 
Permanent contracts* 0.933 0.903 0.925 
Workers in small 
/medium company  
(employees<200) 
0.470 0.663 0.680 
Proportions of 
total 
observations: 
Full-time workers 0.872 0.872 0.921 
Job stayers 0.831 0.785 0.793 
Internal movers 0.150 0.141 0.078 
Worker 
movement: 
proportions of 
total 
observations: 
External movers 
0.114 0.156 0.129 
Overall 3.22 
(0.45) 
2.82 
(0.44) 
1.93 
(0.49) 
Public sector 3.31 
(0.38) 
2.97 
(0.36) 
2.08 
(0.44) 
Big/large 
company (≥200) 
3.33 
(0.39) 
2.99 
(0.38) 
2.05 
(0.46) 
Mean real 
wage, 1995 
prices 
(lnW)**: 
Private 
sector: 
Small/medium 
company (<200) 
3.11 
(0.47) 
2.71 
(0.44) 
1.82 
(0.49) 
Job stayers (ΔlnWS) 
 
0.011 
(0.25) 
0.017 
(0.26) 
0.026 
(0.39) 
Internal movers (ΔlnWW) 
 
0.008 
(0.27) 
0.011 
(0.28) 
0.066 
(0.38) 
Real wage 
changes 
(ΔlnW)***: 
External movers (ΔlnWB) 
 
-0.017 
(0.36) 
-0.026 
(0.34) 
0.067 
(0.52) 
Number of individuals  16,474 4,100 13,758 
Average number of observations each year   5,687 2,096 5,789 
Total number of observations  108,056 23,052 75,262 
 
Notes: * The consistent contract variables in the GSOEP only appear in 1985, 1988 and 1995-2002 
           ** Log form wages are only for full-time workers. 
           *** Wage changes are only for full-time workers, excluding outlying cases.  
11 
Table 2 Real wage and unemployment changes, by sector and firmsize, Males in the GSOEP   
(coefficients on Δut-1 from wage change equation 2) 
 
  West (1984-2002)  East (1992-2002) 
Incremental effects:  Incremental effects:  
 
Job  
stayers internal movers external movers 
 Job  
stayers internal movers external movers 
Public Sector  -0.54 1.42 -2.66  0.50 -0.30 -1.93 
  (0.42) (5.56) (5.09)  (0.36) (1.53) (3.66) 
-1.53* -0.05 -1.65  0.23 -0.23 -0.10 Small firm  
(~20) (0.91) (2.76) (2.62)  (0.41) (2.28) (0.95) 
-1.40*** -0.90 -2.97  -0.30 -0.06 1.41 Medium firm 
(20~200) (0.43) (2.61) (2.62)  (0.36) (0.99) (1.62) 
-1.83*** -0.92 -0.69  -0.76 0.61 2.31 Big firm 
(200~2000) (0.56) (1.41) (2.67)  (0.61) (1.44) (2.07) 
-0.97** -1.35 -6.94  -0.68** 1.90 -0.62 
Private 
sector: 
Large firm 
(2000~) (0.44) (1.97) (6.50)  (0.34) (1.99) (3.41) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for two-tail tests. There are 55,233 individual observations in the first 
stage (46,848 for the west and 8,385 for the east), and 17/10 region-wide weighted time-series observations for the west/east in the second stage.
 
Table 3 Real wage and unemployment changes by sector and firm size, Males in the 
BHPS 1991-2004    
(coefficients on Δut-1 from wage change equation 2) 
  Males (1991-2004) 
 
Job  
stayers 
Incremental 
effect for 
internal movers 
Incremental 
effect for 
external movers 
Whole Economy 
Public Sector  0.03 -1.47 -3.94* 
  (0.81) (3.44) (2.13) 
-2.16** 4.41 1.88 Small firm  
(~25) (0.90) (2.49) (2.42) 
-1.26** 0.46 0.20 Medium firm
(25~200) (0.65) (1.73) (1.14) 
-3.12*** -0.54 -0.90 Big firm 
(200~1000) (0.61) (2.79) (2.13) 
-2.69** -0.83 -1.35 
Private 
sector: 
Large firm 
(1000~) (1.26) (2.91) (4.51) 
North-South Split 
South -1.23*** 0.48 -2.25 
 (0.48) (1.96) (1.36) 
North-Central -1.69*** 0.90 0.19 
 (0.50) (0.69) (1.12) 
Chi-square test for equality of coefficients for South and North-
Central 4.44 (p>0.618) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels for 
two-tail tests. There are 25,667 individual observations in the first stage, and 12 region-wide weighted 
time-series observations for the second stage.  
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Appendix  
Estimation Methodology 
 
The standard decomposition of wage growth (Solon et al, 1997, and Devereux and Hart, 
2006), distinguishing between jobstayers and internal and external movers is: 
 
        E(ΔlnW) =(1- PW - PB) E(ΔlnWS)+ PW E(ΔlnWW)+ PB E(ΔlnWB) 
           = E(ΔlnWS)+ PW E(ΔlnWW - ΔlnWS)+ PB E(ΔlnWB - ΔlnWS)                 (1) 
 
where PW and PB denotes the proportion of workers changing jobs within and between 
companies, and E(ΔlnWS), E(ΔlnWW), and E(ΔlnWB) is the expected wage growth of job 
stayers (S), internal movers (W) and external movers (B). 
 
Differentiating equation (1) with respect to the change in the unemployment rate, 
Δu, provides a decomposition of total wage cyclicality: 
 
       ∂E(ΔlnW)/ ∂(Δu) =  ∂E(ΔlnWS)/ ∂(Δu)  
                                     + PW [∂E(ΔlnWW - ΔlnWS)/ ∂(Δu)]  
                                     + PB [∂E(ΔlnWB - ΔlnWS)/ ∂(Δu)]  
                                     + ∂PW /∂(Δu) [E(ΔlnWW - ΔlnWS)]  
                                     + ∂PB /∂(Δu) [E(ΔlnWB - ΔlnWS)]                                               (2) 
The first term is the wage response of job stayers; the second term defines the 
incremental effect of wage cyclicality on internal movers relative to stayers, and the third 
term defines the incremental effect of wage cyclicality on external movers relative to 
stayers. The last two terms represent the cyclicality of the probability of internal and 
external job changes. Since these terms are small, we concentrate on the wage responses. 
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